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I. INTRODUCTION
Turkey is one of a number of smaller nations which possesses relatively poor,
unsophisticated industrial base. It doesn't have sufficient resources to undertake the
necessary research, development and production required to satisfy its own defense
needs. History shows that Turkey has preferred to purchase a substantial proportion of
its defense requirements from industrialized friendly nations, especially U.S. and West
Germany.
On February 1975, The United States enacted an arms embargo on Turkey in
response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. During the embargo Turkish
armed forces lost many of their operational capabilities due to lack of spare parts and
industrial support. Almost all the defense systems which were purchased from the
United States were in poor condition at the beginning of 1980s.
After 1981, Turkish Government decided to modernize the defense systems which
were possessed by the armed forces by taking into account the experience which were
won from the past defense equipment and system acquisitions.
In November 1985, the Defense Development and Support Administration
(DIDA) was established by the Turkish Government, and large amounts of financial
resources were created for the acquisition of defense systems. At the end of 1985
Turkish Naval Forces decided to modernize its destroyer/frigate fleet by using these
fmancial resources.
Turkish industry doesn't have sufficient technology to undertake the necessary
research, development, production and life cycle support required to design and
construct new type destroyer/frigate. In addition, the demand for the destroyer/frigate
by the Turkish Navy is not enough to design a new type. So, the best way is to acquire
some amount of destroyers/frigates which are designed, constructed and deployed by
the other industrialized friendly nations.
The acquisition of a new system needs a policy. Policy usually includes;
• The requirement; to express needs in mission terms
• The requirement for agency head approval at key decision points (milestones), if
system is newly developed.
• The requirement, that all goods and services be acquired on a competitive basis
to the maximum extent possible, in order to maximize innovation and minimize
cost.
• Consideration of life cycle cost, schedule and logistic supportability.
• Establishment of clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability for
the management of programs.
[Ref 1: p. 5]
In this paper we will express the mission requirements and consideration of life
cycle cost for a competitive force structure and we will choose the best force structure
for the Turkish Destroyer Fleet.
II. TURKISH NAVY CASE
A. MISSION AREA ANALYSIS
A naval operation , taken into broad sense, begins at the stage where the
opponents are more or less ignorant of their relative position. Whoever takes the
offensive v/ill be anxious to keep his initial strategic moves secret so as to retain
freedom of action and, if possible, achieve surprise when the time for action comes.
The defender is equally anxious to locate the enemy, or at least find out roughly where
he is, as soon as possible and to gauge his intentions. This first stage is over when the
mutually unknown quantities are revealed. Stage two in the scheme of things consist
of preparing for ultimate action the enemy must be precisely located and all necessary
steps must be taken in preparation for action. The third and last stage is that of action
itself, and the ultimate and most significant event in any operation is , of course battle.
At stage one, the strategic approach phase could last for months. Today the
means of search are direct optical detection, maritime patrol aircraft with its large
radius action, ship mounted sensors, satillates, and fixed underwater ground acoustic
arrays.
In the second phase of naval operations, the forces involved will be preparing
themselves for ultimate action. At the point where this stage begins, it is assumed that
at least one of the opponents has some operational intelligence about the other. More
precise information is now needed about the situation in the prospective area of action.
What vessels are present in the area? What type are there? Are they friendly, neutral or
enemy? How are they formed up? What are they doing? What might their intentions
be? It is then necessary to detect, locate, identify and analyze the behavior of the
contacts in order to establish a complete pattern of tactical data.
Looking at the principal sensors, we will first consider those that work above the
surface, begining with the radar. Radar achieved its theoretical maximum range early
on, in terms of accessibility of the target, the power is emitted and wave lengths used.
It is possible to deal with several targets and several weapons simultaneously if the
equipment includes electronic scanning. There have also been improvements in
discrimination (the ability to cope with interference, whether due to natural causes or
caused by the enemy e.g Chaff) and in making radar transmissions rather more difficult
to detect.
10
The passive detection of transmissions over a wider and wider wave band has
itself made great progress, from radio frequencies, including radar and thermal
emissions. Passive detection methods are themselves undetectable but they are
dependent on the enemy making detectable transmissions. During second stage passive
detection methods may be inadequate. All these sensors, to which must be added to
the irreplaceable human eye-brain combination, can be carried by ships or patrol
aircraft.
In the silent world below the surface, although sonar has made great strides, it
still offers limited chance of detecting a submarine that wants to avoid it. Passive
listening is making headway largely against noisy submarines, while magnetic anomaly
detection equipment is able to relocate an enemy only at very short range.
The final phase of the operations is battle. At this stage the sensors continue
their work in much the same way as before, but the weapons must now go into the
action.
Traditional arms (guns, torpedoes and ahead throwing antisubmarine weapons)
have been the subject of continual improvement. Modern gunnery control methods
using computers have given fresh life to gunnery by making it considerably more
accurate and greatly increasing the speed with which guns can be brought into action,
that can be entirely automatic from first detection to cease-fire. Multi-barrel small
calibre guns with a very high rate of fire and hea\7 shells are promising new types of
traditional gunnery for small, close range targets. In association with modern radar,
this kind weapon could effectively engage certain types of missiles, even at ver>' short
notice.
Ahead throwing antisubmarine weapons (mainly rockets) are giving ground to
torpedoes but are still attractive by reason of their comparatively low cost, their
suitability for small ships and their improved range. Torpedoes have great advantage
of hitting under water, they strike the most sensitive area of target, whose first need is
to stay afloat, and they benefit from the damping effect of the sea itself which increases
the effect of an explosion underwater.
These advances in traditional weapons are important and in many cases allow
them to keep a place alongside their more modern counterparts.
Missiles are obviously at the top of the new weapon list. At the tactical level the
many kinds of missiles in service have to be distinguished by their purposes. Surface to
surface missiles are so quite light weight and most significantly, a small ship can carry
a destructive power greater than that of gunnery.
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Various types of missiles in use against aircraft have radically changed the nature
of fighting between ships and aircraft. In some instances, an attacking aircraft can be
engaged even before it has a clear view of the situation itself with a high chance of
hitting. However, with conventional radar where data rate is limited, the number of
targets saturated if an attacker is prepared to pay the price.
Defensive or offensive weapon system equipped with modem scanning radar is
capable of dealing with several enemy targets and guiding a number of missiles
simultaneously, the situation is entirely different. Faced with the threat of effective
reaction from the ship under attack, whether or not it has a high performance
antiaircraft missile system, an assailant is likely to stand off and launch an air to
surface missile himself.
Weapon systems must include all the possibilities of active electronic warfare,
that is to say, to whole array of decoys and jammers which, while not killers in
themselves, are handled rather like defensive weapons. Blinding enemy sensors with
false targets or transmissions that saturate the frequencies (presenting the incoming
missiles with baits on which they will home more readily than their genuine targets)
these are all methods of destroying the enemy homing missile systems. From these
stems the needs for opposing all these counter measures (ECiM) by Counter-Counter
measures (ECCiM) which may be either of the same kind themselves or, a change to a
totally different system enabling detection, guidance and terminal homing to be effected
without transmitting, by using instead, the various enemy emissions of radar, infra-red
thermal or light rays.
In summary, the forces which could fight at sea today or in the near future
appear to be distinguished by the following important developments;
• All the actors in naval warfare today would approach the scene of combat
already engaged in a complex preliminary manoeuvre in which numerous
methods of collecting intelligence are set against the methods for confusing or
decisiveing them in various ways. The technical and intellectual mastery of
these phase of naval action is becoming essential to success in combat.
• Fighting itself would be radically changed by the ubiquity of the threat of
attack, which could come at any moment from near or far, from the sky or sea
surface, or from underwater all in the shape of missiles of higher and higher
performance and more and more varied capabilities, and one day, doubtless in
the shape of even more futuristic weapons.
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1 . Geographical location of Turkey
An overview of the geographic location and position of the Turkey will help a
great deal toward the firm understanding of the problems related to one of the Worlds
most historic lands and water groups.
The sea on the southern part of the Turkey is Mediterranean sea and the
coastal length is 1250 km. There is little information on the shelf depths around the
eastern iMediterranean, possibly because of the frequent variation in depths. Along the
Turkish coast from the Rhodes channel eastward to Galidonya Burun there is no
significant continental shelf From Galidonya Burun to Northeastern corner of the
Antalya bay the average width is 4.5 km. Along this shelf the depth varies from 40
meters to 130 meters. Off the gulf of Iskenderun a composite delta of several rivers has
built a shelf 70 km. wide. The shelf break is about 300 m deep along this portion of the
shelf The shelf is very narrow or absent at the Turkish-Syrian border. Along the
southern coast of Turkey the continental slope has a gradient range from 1/24 to 1/10.
The slope is modified in the Gulf of Iskenderun by sediments from the adjacent rivers.
The sea on the western coast of Turkey is Aegean and the length of Turkey's
Aegean coast is 2805 km from Fethiye Bay to Saros Bay.From the frontier of Greece
to Dardannelles straits the Saros Bay banks extends, the depth of the sea varies from
to 25 meters. The depth of the sea from Dardannelles to Izmir (Smyrna) shows the
same properties. Along the coast its depth is usually between 2 to 15 meters. The depth
of the sea is available to all kind vessel along the coast between Izmir to Fethiye Bay.
There are more than 200 islands in the Aegean sea which belong to Greece
and most of them very close to Anatolia. The width of some of the important
waterways between these islands and Anatolia is 1.5 km near the Samos, 4 km near the
Kos. The height of these islands average more than 1000 meters. 2148 m at Crete,
1215 m at Scarpanto, 1160 m at Samos and 1297 m at Khios islands. The Greek
islands in the Aegean sea are available as shelter for enemy warships.
The weather condition is a major problem for operating the vessels on the
Aegean sea. The southern and southeastern winds effects all kind of transportation and
operation. Statistically more than 200 days a year the sea condition is over 4. This is
another constraint for the size of vessels which will operate on the Aegean sea.
The Turkish straits unite the Mediterranean sea, which can be considered a
branch of the Atlantic Ocean and which expands eastward from Gibraltar and cuts
about 2330 miles deep into the triple continent, with the Black sea, which itself is a
vast alcove of the Mediterranean.
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This waterway separates the continents of Asia and Europe from each other,
and this divides Turkey into two natural sections.
• The European section: This is a "wedge shaped" segment of the Balkan
peninsula and lies east of the Meric river, and has frontage on the Aegean sea,
the straits and the Black sea. This section is commonly known as Trakya.
• The Asiatic section: This is a large peninsula with a kind of Rectangular shape
which reaches towards Europe between the eastern Mediterranean basin and
the Black sea. This part of the Turkey commonly known as Anatolia.
Whenever mentioned in international law, the term "Turkish straits" legally
includes the three geographical distinct sections, the Dardannelles, the sea of Marmara
and the Bosphorus, which collectively make up the narrow but highly strategic
waterway which is a link of about 378 km in length between the almost land locked
Black sea and Mediterranean.
Dardannelles: The length of the Dardannelles is about 72 km. Its width varies
from 8.1 km at the Aegean externetiy to 1400 meters at the narrowest part. The rolling
hills with relatively low banks are of a brownish grey color wherever they are not
covered by the maquis and other species of Mediterranean vegetation. The depth varies
from 50 to 100 meters. As the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara are considerably
deeper, the Dardannelles form a kind of under water plateau between the two seas. The
two main flows of the complicated current systems are
• A strong surface current from Black sea to Aegean sea
• A deeper under water current from Aegean sea to Black sea
At the narrows of Dardannelles and nearly points the surface current acquires
a speed which sometimes reaches 5 miles per hour. Most of the sailing vessels without
strong enough engines, when going up the current, need towing, especially in the
weather with northerly or northeasterly winds
The Sea of Marmara: This small inland sea which was known as Propontis in
the classical age has an area of 14500 square km. It is coimected with the Black Sea
through the Bosphorus and to the Aegean through the Dardannelles. The length of the
sea is 306 km, its extreme width is about 90 km. Most of the small bays are really
shallow. With the exception of days with very strong southerly (Lodos) or northerly
(Poyraz) winds, navigation is easy.
Bosphorus: The length of the straits is about 18 miles. Its depth varies from 30
to 80 meters and it reaches its maximum depth at the narrowest point where the
erosion of the currents is the greatest.The width of the Bosphorus varies from 570
meters at the narrowest pomt to 3.6 km at the largest point.
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The Bosphorus has no sandbars and very few beaches, the shores are for the
most part elevated and the rolling hills reach the shores at a rather step angle. The
system of currents in the Bosphorus is similar to the one in Dardannelles. On some
spots the currents are so strong that they form whirlpools and are called "Devil's
current". The erosive action of these currents is tremendous. Navigation is often
difficult toward to the entrance to the Black sea because of lack of physical barriers
against the northwest winds and northeast winds. [Ref 2: p. 10]
2. The Potential Enemies and Their Naval Forces
In this geographical region the possible enemies of the Turkey are U.S.S.R,
Syria and Greece. Small information about their naval forces on the Black sea and
Mediterranean sea will help us to understand which operational capability is required
for the Turkish Navy.
The Soviet Union has embarked on a maritime strategy designed to help it
break out of its long history of continental confinement. This policy means, in the first
instance, attempts to control the Baltic sea, the Black sea and ultimately the
Mediterranean. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union is probably striving to become the
dominant power in such vital straits as the Bosphorus and Dardannelles, through
which its fleets must pass to reach the high seas.
Beyond these goals, the Soviets want to gain dominant influence at several
major junctions of the world's seaways. Specifically, they have their sights on the Suez
canal, and strait of Gibraltar. In pursuit of these ends, the Soviets would most likely
try systematically to limit and eventually to stop noncommunist naval operations in
areas they consider strategically critical to their plans.
The Red Baimer Black sea fleet is responsible for operations in the Black sea
and, more significantly, it provides surface warships and aircraft for operations in the
Mediterranean sea as the fifth Eskadra (Task Force). However, the Black sea fleet
doesn't provide submarines for Mediterranean operations. The Black sea is essentially a
"Soviet Lake" with Turkey the only potentially hostile nation bordering the sea.
After World War Two the shipyards in the Black sea region were rapidly
rehabilated to help to rebuild the Soviet fleet. The formation of NATO in 1949 with
Turkey and Greece successfully resisting communist takeover seemed to deny the Black
sea fleet easy access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish straits. Still, in 1958 the
Soviets first deployed naval forces in to the Mediterranean. These were submarines that
in 1960 were based, with a tender, at Vlore, Albania. The following year the Soviets
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were forced to abandon VIore, leaving behind two Whiskey class submarines seized by
Albanians. The loss of this base pointed up the limitation of Soviet naval logistics and
Soviet combatant forces were not again deployed on a sustained bases to the
Mediterranean until 1964.
From the mid 1960s onward Soviet naval forces have operated continuously in
the Mediterranean, with surface ships and aircraft coming from the Black sea and
submarines from the Northern Fleet. By the early 1970s the Soviets had an average
daily strength of 50 or more naval units in the Mediterranean on a regular basis. This
force, the Fifth Eskadra, reached a peak strength of some 60 surface ships and 25
submarines during the October 1973 confrontation with the U.S in the Yom Kippur
war in the Middle East. Effort to obtain support bases for the Soviet Mediterranean
squadron have centered on Egypt (until they were ejected in 1973) and Syria. The
typical composition of the Fifth Eskadra is:
6-8 Torpedo attack submarines
1 - 2 Cruise missile attack submarines
1 - 2 Missile cruisers
6-8 Destroyers and Frigates
1 - 3 Mine sweepers
1-3 Amphibious ships
15-20 Auxiliary ships
5-6 Survey research and intelligence collection ships
Soviet combat operations in the Black sea and Mediterranean would be
supported by land based naval aircraft from bases in Crimea. In addition cruiser-
helicopter carriers of the Moskova class are based in the Black sea and operate
regularly in the Mediterranean as do the Kiev class aircraft carriers when they are in
the Black sea area. The Black sea fleet also has the largest cruiser/destroyer force of
any of the Soviet fleets. In total, the Black sea fleet has 27 percent of the navy's major
combatants (frigates and above) but only 7 percent of the Navy's submarines (with no
nuclear or baUistic missile units) including the Caspian flotilla. The Black sea fleet has
25 percent of the Navy's aircraft and 22 percent of the personnel.
The country on the west the neighbor and NATO AUiy is Greece. The violent
manifestation of Greek nationalism in Cyprus in 1955, the beginning of a new
generation-long crisis between Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus crisis in 1974 again
tested mutual obligations and responsibilities. The purpose of Turkish military
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intervention in July, justified by Turkey's obligation under the 1960 Treaty of
guarantee, was to protect the Turkish minority fi-om the "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus"
which was led by an international terrorist, installed by a coup, backed by military
dictatorship in Athens, and bent on union with Greece.
As Wictor Papacosma observes, Greece appears to struggle with its NATO
partners more vigorously than with the Soviet antagonist. On the one hand, there is
the continuing conflict with Turkey that centers on the future of Cyprus. Disputes
continue over operational control, territorial waters, and airspace rights in the Aegean.
[Ref2:p. 11]
On the south, the neighbor of Turkey is Syria which has coast along the
Eastern Mediterranean sea has potential hostility against Turkey. In the past two
countries had a lot of problem and for which they couldn't find any solution. After
1960s Syria has strong relationship with USSR and most of the naval vessels were
bought from USSR. Today Syrian navy has:
• 3 submarines (2 Ex Soviet Romeo, 1 Ex Soviet Whiskey class)
• 2 Frigates (Ex Soviet "Petya 11" Class
• 3 Ex Soviet "Plonochny B" Class amphibious ships.
• 22 Fast Attack Craft-Missile boat {Ex Soviet OSA I, OSA II, Comar classes)
which are equipped with SSM; 4SS-N-2
• 8 Fast Attack-Torpedo (Ex Soviet "P-4") Class
During the active war, it is obvious that Turkish navy can't operate against
the USSR navy which one of the most advanced navies in the world, in open sea like
Black sea or Mediterranean by itself. In reality the NATO war plans shows that other
allied navies will operate together against the Warsaw pact navies. But in the short
term, a small navy, by using speed and geographical advantage may give big damage to
enemy vessels. The most available waterway and seas are the Turkish straits and
Aegean sea for this kind operation. So when we select the type of destroyer/frigate
which candidate for Turkish Navy, we will take into account the geographical position
of straits and Aegean sea and their limitations on the characterestics of the
destroyer/frigate.
B. PRESENT CAPABILITIES OF THE TURKISH DESTROYER FLEET
The primary source of the Turkish destroyer fleet is the United States. During the
1960s and 1970s the U.S sold and leased its surplus destroyers which were built during
the World War II to Turkey. Today the Turkish Na\7 has 8 Ex- U.S Gearing, 2 Ex-
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Fletcher, 2 Ex- Carpenter, 1 Ex- U.S Allen M Sumner, 1 Ex- U.S Robert H Smith
classes destroyers and 2 Koln-West German, 2 Berk-Turkish classes frigates.
These destroyers were purchased from the United States under priced. U.S sold
them at scrap value instead of the higher market value. For example; the Mc Kean
(DD 784) was sold for S 357,410 when its market value was S 1,133,443. Additionally
the conversion cost, administrative cost and fuel weren't included when the Mc Kean
pricing.
Four destroyers were leased from the United States in better condition. When
they leased DD 822 had S 8,500,000, DD 842 had S 7,900,000, DD 825 had $ 7,900,000
and DD 827 had S 3,321,000 market value, but they were leased without lease
payment. [Ref 3: p. 3]
The present type destroyers and their charecterestics are:
1. Gearing Class
These destroyers were built just after the World War II, between 1945-1946 by
the U.S naval shipyards. During the 1950s they were modified, electronic and ASW
capabilities were improved by the U.S shipyards. After 1973 eight destroyer were
transferred/leased to Turkish Navy.
During the Cyprus invasion, Turkish Navy realized that the destroyers doesn't
have enough electronic warfare, communication capability and air defense system.
Between 1976-1985 these destroyers were equipped 40 mm orligon, 35 mm oerlikon
with sapan fire control system.
In 1986, two destroyer were equipped with Harpoon guided missile system by
the Turkish Naval Shipyard. Today there are small variations between the capabilities
of these destroyers, but main characterestics are;
• Steam propalsion system, 33 knots max speed, 5800 miles max range at 15
knot speed.
• 5"/38" gun with GFCS Mk 37 fire control system, 35 mm oerlikon with sapan
fire control system.
• ASROC-8 tube launcher, 2 triple Mk 42 torpedo tubes, AN/SQS 23 sonar as
ASW weapon and systems.
• AN/SPS 40 long range air search radar, AN/SPS 10 surface radar, Decca
navigation radar
Annual operation cost of each Gearing class destroyer is approximately S
3,300,000. The highest proportion of the cost is maintenance cost, because of the age
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of these destroyers. The response time of the main propulsion system is too long, in
normal condition 4 hours and in emergency situation 2 hours. The response time of the
fire control system is not sufficient to defend the ship against advanced surface to
surface missiles, air to surface missiles and jet fighters. But the shipyards have large
experience with these ships and ship systems, and so maintenance is easy.
2. Carpenter Class Destroyers
Two destroyers were laid down in October 1945 and commissioned by the U.S
Navy in November 1949. USS Robert A Owens (DD 827) were transferred in 1981
and USS Carpenter (DD 825) were transferred in 1982 to Turkish Navy. In 1984 both
of them were equipped with 3750" and 35 mm oerlikon gun with SPG 35 and Sapan II
fire control system. In 1987 Turkish Naval shipyard decided to modernize these
destroyers with VLS Seasparrow air defense missile and STIR radar. The
charesterestics of these destroyers are:
• Steam turbine main propulsion system, 33 knot maximum speed and 5800 miles
maximum range at 15 knot speed without refueling.
• 2-5738" iMk 38 gun with iMk 56 fire control system, 2-3"/50" gun with iMk 114
fire control system, and 35 mm oerlikon gun with Sapan fire control system.
• ASROC 8-tube launcher, 2 triple Mk 32 torpedo tubes, AN/SQS 23 sonar as
ASW weapons and systems.
• AN SPS 40 long range air search radar, SPS 10 surface radar and Decca
navigation radar.
Annual operating cost as the same Gearing class destroyers. But
modernization cost is high for Seasparrow, STIR radar and 35 mm Oerlikon gun.
Total modernization cost is approximately S 21,092,000for each destroyer. Still
communication systems are insufficient, ECM and ECCM capabilities doesn't exist or
are in poor condition. The economic life of the systems which will be mounted to
these destroyers is about 25 years, but the economic life of these destroyers are less
than 10 years. They are already 38 year old, and this differance causes increased
annual operating cost.
3. Koln Class Frigates
Two frigate were constructed in October 1959 by the H.C Stulcken-West
Germany, and commissioned by the West German Navy in 1962. Both frigates were
transferred to Turkish naval forces in 1983. The characterestics of these frigates are:
• Gas turbine main propulsion system, 28 knot maximum speed and 920 mile
maximum range at 28 knot speed.
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• 2-100 mm gun with M 45 fire control system, 6-40 mm guns with two M 45 fire
control system.
• 4-28" AS torpedo tubes, 80 mines and PAE/CWE M/F hull mounted sonar as
ASW weapon and weapon s>'stems.
• Surface and air search radar, DA 102 target designator radar.
The maintenance of the main propulsion system of these frigates are a big
problem for the Turkish shipyards, because none of the shipyards have gas turbine
overhaul capability. Another problem with these frigates is ventilation systems. These
frigates were designed for the northern seas. The climate of the Mediterranean sea and
Aegean sea is too warm for these frigates and during the summer months most of the
electronic devices are off because of the cooling problem. The range of the long range
air search radar is not enough (120 km) to detect the enemy targets in open sea, like
Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. They don't have any active guided surface-to-
surface, surface-to-air missile system. Annual operating cost of these frigates
approximately S 3,100,000 .
4. Berk Class Frigates
First major warships which were built in Turkey in 1971, and were
commissioned in 1973 (TCG Berk), 1975 (TCG Peyk). Main propulsion systems were
purchased from Italy and almost all the electronic equipments and weapon systems
were purchased from the United States. Main characterestics of these frigates are:
• Diesel engine main propulsion system, 25 knot maximum speed, 2500 mile
maximum range at 18 knot speed.
• 4-3750" gun with GFCS Mk 63 fire control system
• 2 triple Mk 32 AS torpedo tubes, 2 Mk 11 hedgogs and AN-SQS 29 series
sonar as ASW weapon and systems.
• AN-SPS 40 long range air search radar, AN-SPS 10 surface radar and AN-SPG
34 fire control radar.
Annual operating cost of each Berk class frigates are S 3,153,000. The
maintenance of these frigates aren't easy since the lack of spare parts of main




The structures today's navies, have evaluated largely from the historical needs of
individual nations to counter threats to their security and to protect their lifelines of
maritime trade. The situation today is no different. NATO is a maritime community
with its member nations not only linked together by the sea but globally with a
dependence upon its free use, and it is this dependence which underpins the missions of
our maritime forces;
• to deter aggression, through presence and visible projection of power
• to protect maritime trade and sea lines of communication
• to ensure the safe and timely arrival of reinforcements and resupply shipping
• to fight in response to aggression to achieve sea control and denial.
To meet these competing and demanding roles, balanced and capable naval
forces are required, ranging from strike carriers through submarines to maritime patrol
aircraft. But the vital and multipurpose component of all major navies has been and
remains, the escort.
For any new class of multi role escort, it takes some 10 years from initial concept
to operational status. It is therefore not surprising that even for the 1990s the dice are
already cast, and a quick survey of some national and NATO plans shows that no
significant change in approach to the escort question could be achieved much before
the end of the next decade. Some examples of escorts under design or construction for
service in 1990s are as follows:
United States. Arleight Burke destroyers
United Kingdom. Type 23 frigates
Canada. Patrol Frigate Programme
.
Germany. Type 122 frigates
Italiy. Animoso class destroyers
Netherland. M class frigates
NATO. Nato Frigate Replacement Programme
These programmes are essentially only linear projections of previous classes with
updated equipment. Even the multinational project of the NATO Frigate Replacement
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Programme (NFR 90) falls into the linear projection category. The ships as currently
envisaged are a logical progression of a mix of earlier designs, with state of the art
sensors and weapons.
Collaborating offers the most cost effective-way of producing ships and weapon
systems for the future, if correctly managed. In this respect the NATO Frigate
Replacement Programme is the outstanding example so far. In theory an5rway, the
bigger the production run, the smaller the unit production cost.
The NATO Project Management Office (PMO) considered that the savings
would be of the order of 15-25 per cent when compared to individual national
procurement. Compromiser had to be reached but the conclusion was that some 80 per
cent of the various different equipments required by the individual nations could be
accommodated. NATO officals believe that some 50 frigates will be built at a cost of
between S200 million to S300 million each. Since the project will remain open to other
NATO nations, the number could grow in due course.
The aim is to design a common hull in which the required subsystems, such as
weapons, power units sensors and communications equipment would be accommodated
in modular form. This would give considerable scope to the industries of participating
nations with a great range of possible off-set agreements. There would also be
considerable exchange of ideas, knowledge and technological background which would
enhance the fmal result. [Ref 5: p. 23]
B. DEFENSE AGREEMENTS OF TURKEY
The source of defense equipment for the Turkish Navy should be a NATO allied
country. But the relationships between these aUies show big difierance. These
relationships will be one of the key factors when selecting the type of vessel.The quick
review of the international relationships in defense area will give us some of the basic
factors for source selection.
I. Turkey-West Germany Defense Cooperation
German - Turkish cooperation in the area of defense is based on an eventful
history of the German Turkish relations. In the 19.th century close cooperation was
established between the German and Ottoman Empires. During the times of worldwide
difTiculties in the twenties many Germans found a second home in Turkey.
On the base of their traditional friendship, Germany and Turkey have had
close trade relations for several decades. The Federal Republic of Germany is also the
biggest single economic partner of Turkey with first place in Turkish exports and
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second place in Turkish imports. In this context, another important factor of German-
Turkish relations can not go unmentioned; Millions of Turks, together with their
families, have lived and worked hard in Germany, thus contributing to the well
functioning and development of West German economy over the last 25 years. Besides
the frequently cited and so often proved German Turkish friendship, this integration of
Turkey in Europe and the western alliance also gives added significance to her relations
with the Federal Republic of Germany.
With the establishment of the Defense Industry Development and Support
Administration (DIDA) in November 1985, the Turkish Government has shown that it
wants to assist the domestic industry in the build up and modernization of production
capacities for armaments. Technical assistance for the modernization of the Turkish
shipyards in Golcuk and Taskizak can testify to many years of successful cooperation
with German industrial firms for the benefit of the Turkish Forces.
The value of defense aid which is provided in slices (with a volume of the
current slice of 130 million DM, of which 80 per cent is used for the procurement of
new material, while 20 per cent consist of surplus material of the German Armed
Forces) has so far reached an overall volume of the 1450 million DM. Additional aid
has been provided in the form of special equipment aid to a value of 600 million DM,
two material aid programs totalling about 1,005 million DM and recently the deliver of
Transtall aircraft worth 300 million DM result in the value of the material and services
made available so far by the Federal Republic of Germany to Turkey free of charge
amounting to 3,355 million DM.
The cooperation of German industry with military repair and production
establishments as well as with government owned firms and private industrial
enterprises in Turkey can be intensively expanded. In many talks with the managers of
German industrial firms. It was found that they are ready and prepared to cooperate
with the Turkish industry. German firms have realized that their future doesn't lie in
mere exports of finished products. They are willing to share risks and successes with
the Turkish partners for the benefit of both sides. And they know from experiences
that Turks, devoted and industrious as they are at all levels from worker to engineer,
are most reliable and therefore most valuable partners. [Ref 6: p. 65]
The measures taken by the Turkish Government to promote the establishment
of production facilities, to acquire the defense equipment and removal the bureaucratic
obstacles to the establishment of joint ventures play a decisive role in this regard.
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2. Turkey-U.S Defense Cooperation
U.S Congress enacted public law 75, providing assistance for Turkey in 1947.
This first action under the Truman doctrine to "support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" was an historic
departure from earlier American policies of peacetime isolationism. And it marked the
beginning of a very special relationship between U.S and Turkey.
That relationship was broadened and deepened in 1952 when the protocol to
the North Atlantic Treaty welcoming Greece and Turkey into NATO was approved.
By the terms of the basic Treaty, this action meant recognition that these two
European states were "in a position to further the principles of Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area", which despite its name
,
henceforth included the Eastern Mediterranean area as well.
Regarding U.S. aid to Turkey, the Congressional security assistance
programmes note that, Turkey is a key NATO ally with important responsibilities for
the defence of the vital southern flank of the Alliance. Turkey plays a stabilizing role in
the Middle East, Southeast Asia region, and unfortunately Turkey has the lowest
national income per capita in NATO, but she maintains the second largest armed
forces in the Alliance. Because of the economic problems, Turkish Armed Forces need
external aid in order to accomplish its defense objectives.
The U.S. has extended more than 6 billion dollars in grants and credits to
Turkey for both economic and military purposes.
The Foreign Military Sales Financing Programme (FMS) offers credits to
facilitate the purchase of the U.S. military equipment, spare parts,training and other
services to meet basic defense requirements. Turkey finds it diflicult to pay in cash for
major defense acquisitions but is financially capable of assuming loan obligations for
military purchases. In addition to standard treasury interest rates, a concessional rate
component provides flexibility to address the needs of friendly nations with economic
problems requiring more favourable credit terms but not an all grant programme.
The Military Assistance Programme (MAP) grant financing is made available
to select countries for the acquisition of defence equipment and services. The United
States provides MAP funds to coalition defence partners and front line states who are
financially unable to maintain adequate self defence without diverting scarce resources
from national economic development.
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The Economic Support Fund (ESF) assists foreign nations in attacking the
root causes of economic and political disruption and in creating the conditions
necessary for sustainable economic growth. The programme promotes infrastructure
development and helps receipents correct structural economic weakness.
The International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET)
provides grant professional military training to foreign military and related civilian
defense personnel in the United States and in facilities overseas. IMET participants
receive instruction in U.S. military skills and doctrine, thereby improving Iheir ability
to manage their own country's military resources.
TABLE 1
U.S. DEFENSE AID TO TURKEY
>
1984 TO 1987 (S MILLION)
YEAR 1984 1985 1986 1987
Forms of Assist. Admin. Admin. Admin. Admin.
Prop. Appr. Prop. Appr. Prop. Appr. Prop. Appr.
Military Assist.
FMS
Concessional . 275 250 345 330.1 455
Market Rate 525 585 250 235 210 79.3 145
Total FMS 525 585 525 485 555 409.4 600
MAP 230 130 230 215 230 205.7 220
IMET 4 3.1 4 3.1 4 3.3 4
Tot.Mil.Assist. 759 718.1 759 703.1 789 618.4 824
Economic Assist.
Concessional 100 63.5 85 85 70 19.6
Grant 75 75 90 90 80 100
Tot.Econ. Asst. 175 138.5 175 175 150 119.6 150
Tot. Sec. Assist. 934 856.6 934 878.1 939 738 974
[Ref. 7: p. 36]
The amount of defense aid to Turkey by the United States needs approval of
the Senate. Each year U.S. Senate members discuss the amount of economical and
defense aid for Turkey. This discussion includes;
• U.S Bases in Turkey
• Minority Problems in Turkey
• The defense responsibility of Turkey in NATO
• Cyprus problem
• Turkey - Greece relationships
• The international relations of Turkey with Soviet Union and Arabic countries
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• Political situation in Turkey
• Turkey's debt and economic problems
[Ref. 8: p. 11-18]
It can easily be understood that this kind discussion in U.S Senate may be
influenced by minority people who live in the United States. This is a problem that
damages Turk-U.S cooperation.
Another problem related to defense cooperation is the interest payment of the
loan by the Turkish Government. The rate is usually equal to the market interest rate
and it is cut by the United States Government automatically. When the total amount
of the expense is increasing the net amount which can be used for system acquisition is
continuously decreasing.
C. THE POTENTIAL INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT CAPABILITIES OF TURKEY
It has been pointed out that complete self-sufliciency in arms production could
be achieved over a long period under peace-time conditions. Even the production of
small arms and ammunition requires inputs of special metals and tools, and machine
shop skills. When the list is extended to ships and aircrafts then the level of skills and
equipment required are considerably more advanced and power sources, metal
fabrication and instrumentation become more critical.
If the production or maintenance of arms is to generate constructive linkages in
the domestic economy, the the manufacturing base must be capable of supplying the
necessary inputs. Otherwise the components, tools and raw materials will be imported
and the defense facilities will merely assemble the products.
During the 1960s, and particularly after the arms embargo, purchases of weapons
began to make a bigger drain on Turkey's foreign exchange because of the wrong
source selection.
1. Industrial Manufacturing Base
In general, there are figures available on the pattern of industrial employment
in defense production which point to the following industries as begin the most
important:




Metal working machine tools




Ordinance and small arms
Other mechanical engineering
Scientific, surgical and photographic instruments
Electrical machinery
Insulated wires and cables
Telegraph, telephone apparatus
Other electrical goods




In explosives and fire arms production, there is only one firm, which is owned
by the government, MKAE. It produces all kind ammunition for Army, Navy and Air
Force, 20 mm ,35 mm anti aircraft gun for the navy under the licence of Oerlikon. In
addition to these, MKAE has an agreement for the joint production of Maverick and
Stinger Post with the European partners.
In iron and steel production, Turkish industry doesn't have any problem. All
kinds of iron products and high quality steel are produced by the national industry.
Light metals, steel tubes, metal working machine tools, hydrolic presses, special
mechanical equipments, high pressure hydrolic gear pumps (licenced from Dowty and
Plassey), hydrolic steering units (under the licence of ZF- West Germany), various
servo valves and power packages are produced by a couple of private firms.
Electromechanical products, electric motors, electronic components, electronic
switch boards, copper wire and aluminium products are produced with European
characteristics by Turkish industry.
As industrial engines, turbo charged diesel engines up to 280 Hp under the
licence of MAN-West Germany, up to 2,000 Hp under the licence of Rolls Royce-UK,
up to 5,000 Hp naval diesel engines under the licence of Sulzer-Switzerland are
manufactured in Turkey. However in this group, all kinds steam turbines, internal
combustion engines larger than 5,000 Hp and all kind gas turbines are not
manufactured by the Turkish industry
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Recently some of the private firms invested large amount capital in the
electronic industry. But the largest electronic equipment producers are government
owned firms. Today electronic industry produce VHF equipment (under the licence of
Philips-Netherland), joint production in the European Maverick,low level air defense
having an arrangement v^dth Contraves (Sky Guard) and Raytheon (Sparrow),
telecommunication equipments, analogue radio link systems, telephone sets, electronic
teleprinter machines, resistors (under the licence of Bultronics Corporation-Japan),
ceramic disks (under the licence of Thompson CSF- France) and the metallysed
polyester film capacitors (under the licence of Acrotronics-Italy). [Ref 10: p. 40]
Turkish industry has close relationships with European countries, especially
West Germany, Sv^dtzerland, Italy and France and their industries. Some of the Turkish
firms are engaged in joint production programmes with European partners. It is
obvious that Turkish industry has a great potential to support European origin defense
systems than the defense systems manufactured by non European friendly nations.
2. Golcuk Naval Shipyard
The first steps in the construction of the Golcuk Naval Shipyard were taken
view of docking the battleship TCG YAVUZ, the former German HMS "GOEBEN".
An important improvement programme was started after approval of the U.S aid
programme in 1947. Additional facilities were constructed using national funds and
most of the equipment which is in operation today was supplied through these
programmes. 1962 was the turning point for the Golcuk Naval Shipyard, when
complete submarine overhaul was started in cooperation with the bureau of ships and
some U.S specialists.
During the 1970s Golcuk shipyard built two escort destroyers, BERK
(commissioned date 1973), PEYK (commission date 1975). At the end of the 1980 new
submarine construction facilities was constructed with the help of West Germany and
first two submarine Type 209/1200 were commissioned by the Turkish Navy. The
manufacturing
,
repair and maintenance staff of shipyard gained their experience on the
wide variety of naval electrical and electronic equipment on board Turkish naval ships
over the past 50 years. Shipyards now produce naval shipboard, electronic equipment
such as fire control systems and it's derivatives, a communication security system and
an under water telephone system.
Today the shipyard has 28,000 tons of total lifting capacity in floating docks,
two slipways with dimensions of 150 x 24 and 80 x 20 meters, a building capacity for
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ships up to 30,000 DW, one submarine construction facility which builds Type
209/1200 and employes 100 qualified engineers and about 5000 workers.
Maintenance facilities of the Golcuk. Shipyard are responsible for supporting
the Destroyers (U.S Gearing, U.S Carpenter, U.S Allen M. Sumner, U.S Robert H.
Smith and U.S Fletcher classes) and Frigates (Ex German Koln, Turkish Berk classes).
These vessels are completely overhauled by the shipyard periodically. The present
overhaul and repair capacity of the shipyard includes:
All kind hull repair for the different type vessels (from submarine to fiber sailing
boat).
All kind welding and related repair jobs.
Overhaul of ship main propulsion system (steam propulsion system up to
30,000 hp for single system, diesel propulsion system up to 5,000 hp for single
system)
Production and maintenance of high capacity naval pumps and valves.
Production and repair of all kinds electric motor (440 V, 3 Phase, 60 cycle and
380 V, 3 Phase, 50 Cycle) up to 1,000 hp AC and DC.
Overhaul of electronic equipment, naval radars, sonar systems (AN-SPS/10,
AN-SPA/29, AN-SPA/40, DECCA, Philips, AN-SQS 30)
Overhaul of weapon systems (all kind gunnery, Mk 32, Mk 56 torpedos,
ASROC, Harpoon Systems)
3. Taskizak Naval Shipyard
The Taskizak Naval Shipyard located on the Golden Horn within the present
city limits of Istanbul was founded in 1455. In the following decades the yard built and
maintained most of the vessels in the Ottoman Navy. The peace treaty after World
War I, made Istanbul a demilitarized zone. Shipyard started working on merchant
vessels and most of the machinery and equipment was transported to Golcuk and other
shipyards.
In 1941, Taskizak Naval Shipyard was reopened on a very limited bases
employing only skillful workers and a few engineers. Then started a period of growth to
bring the yard gradually to the present size, employing 3,000 workers.
Today the functions of the shipyard are:
• New construction: designing, building and out fitting of military and merchant
vessels up to 10,000 DWT.
• Repair work: which includes the periodic maintenance, overhaul and repair of
about 190 ships per annual schedule plus emergency repairs when needed.
• Docking activities: this means dr>' docking of the above mentioned ships.
Shipyard has two floating docks with lifting capacities of 3,000 and 2,500 tons
respectively and a dry dock for small vessels of about 500 tons.
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• Miscellenous activities: this covers ail kinds of technical and practical assistance
to military and industrial establishments in the area.
Taskizak, first of all is a naval shipyard with the primary purpose of
constructing fast, modern naval vessels of relatively small tonnage and various types of
modern landing vessels.
Since 1941 Taskizak has completed about 120 ships, large and small. The
range of ships include landing ships,patrol craft, coast guard vessels, fast patrol boats,
tankers and coasters. Some of the most important projects included construction of five
DOGAN class guided missile boats armed with Harpoon under the licence of Lurssen,
14 high speed coast guard boats type SAR-33 which can be equipped with guided
missile system. [Ref 10: p. 46]
D. PERSONNEL TRAINING
The individual training is done in two phases as naval school training and
professional training. Naval school training can be categorized in two groups, a school
for officers and a school for petty officers.
The school for officers offers four years of high school with classes in foreign
language (English) and modern science and mathematics programmes,
followed by four years in the Naval Academy where the students acquire the
Bachelor's degree. The academy educates students in seven branches and teaches
tactical, technical and logistic usage of arms
,
standing watch in surface units, and also
trains officers to perform staff missions.
After graduation from the Naval Academy as a naval officer, each offiicer attends
a two-month experimental course which is related with their duties in the navy. In
Turkish navy, most of the ship systems are U.S originated and officers have enough
theoretical background. At the end of the two month period, they have an acceptable
level of experience with warships and weapon systems.
At the end of six year service in the navy, offiicers attend a six-month course
which includes advanced level theoretical and practical training on special systems.
They are appointed as senior officers after graduation from these courses.
Each year Turkish Navy selects 10-15 officers and sends them to other countries
for higher education. The education expenses of the students who attend Naval
Postgraduated School are paid from the FMS credits, the expenses of short term
system courses in the United States are paid from the IMET. If Turkish Navy sends
officers to another country like England and West Germany, the education expenses
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will be paid by the Turkish Government. Each year total number of the Turkish
ofTicers who study at the United States schools average 45. This number is really high,
if we compare it with the total number of officers in the Turkish Navy (2700 ofTicers).
In personnel training, Turkish Navy has close cooperation with the United States.
The preparation school for petty officers runs three years, providing the petty
officer candidates with general knowledge and professional training to high school
level. The advanced school for petty officers is a school which provides the students
with theoretical and practical training consolidating their professional knowledge and
getting them accustomed to life on board.
The training of the petty officers in the Turkish Navy continues in order to
improve their operational capability by means of practical training at training bases.
The problem is during their education at the preparation school and advanced school
they don't have enough theoretical background about U.S originated systems and
foreign language (English). Their skills are relatively lower.
Of 18 month Military service is required in Turkey. All do enlisted service when
they reach 20 years of age. All enlisted personnel go on the ship without taking any
previous courses about the ship and ship systems. Their educational background isn't
enough to learn U.S. originated ships and ship systems. They can learn European
originated systems more easily by using their civil life experience. Common problems
are the same as petty officers have.
But training facilities were established with the help of the United States and
training personnel have strong backgrounds with U.S designed ship and weapon
systems. If the Turkish Navy decides to acquire a defense system different from a U.S
designed system, these training facilities should be reestablished and training personnel
must be sent to system manufacturer's facilities in order to improve their experience on
the new system. The establishment of new facilities and additional training in other
countries will increase the total life cycle cost of the defense systems.
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The first step for the procurement of the new defense systems is to decide
whether the Turkish Navy needs new frigates/destroyers or not.
In chapter two we gave some background about the capabilities of the Russian
and Syrian naval forces in Black sea, Aegean sea and Mediterranean sea, and the
physical characteristics of these operational areas. And we outlined the present
capabilities of the Turkish Destroyer Fleet.
It is obvious that, the present Turkish Destroyer fleet doesn't have any surface to
air (SAiM), effective short range air/missile defense gun systems. The present surface to
surface missile systems are limited. The economic life of the present destroyer fleet is
exceeded, and maintenance and logistic support is insufllcient and expensive.
In the operational area the destroyer fleet doesn't have enough capabilities to win
in actions with probable enemy warships. As a decision maker we concluded that the
present structure of the Turkish Destroyer Fleet must be changed as soon as possible.
Changing all destroyers will be too expensive for the Turkey. But in the short
run, it has enough resources to acquire three or four new frigates and modernize some
number of present destroyers with more eflective weapons.
A. OBJECTIVES
In the decision making process the objectives are what military aim or aims are
we trying to accomplish with the forces, equipments, projects or tactics that the
analysis is designed to compare. Often the statement the objectives is the hardest part
of analysis to aid the decision maker, just like they are in our case.
The easiest way of defining objectives is to outline the tasks of Turkish Navy.
Within the frame work of threat evaluation and the responsibilities in pursueing the
East-West balance Na\7 objectives can be outlined as follows:
• to organize, plan and conduct surveillance (early warning) systems within the
naval theatre of operations.
• to test by exercises the operations that will destroy or neutralize the hostile
enemy forces. In case of engagement:
• to establish naval control in order to neutralize the enemy's naval operations.
• to organize and conduct the control and protection for merchant sliipping.
• to conduct defensive and offensive mine operations.
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• to conduct amphibious operations when necessary.
• to provide naval support for land operations.
• to defend bases and ports.
The Turkish Destroyer Fleet by itself is responsible to accomplish all these tasks
except defensive or ofiensive mine operations and amphibious operations. So our
objectives will be to meet the requirements which are necessary in order to accomplish
given tasks. [Ref 10: p. 38]
B. ALTERNATIVES
The alternatives are the options or means available to the decision maker by
which the objectives can be attained. Alternatives need not to be obvious substitutes
for each other nor perform the same specific functions. In our case the best alternative
would be to join the NATO frigate replacement programme (NFR 90) if it isn't only in
theory.
Based on the present structure of the Turkish Navy the other best
frigate/destroyer sources are the United States and West Germany. The United States
has a program to construct some number Arleight Burke class destroyers which will be
in operation during the 1990s. These destroyers are too large in order to accomplish
given mission in narrow waterways like Aegean sea and Turkish straits and too
expensive (S 780,000,000) for a country which has limited resources for defense
expenses. Instead of these destroyers, we select Perry class frigates which had been
deployed since 1960s by the United States and a couple friendly NATO nations. The
shipsystems of these frigates are recently upgraded and maintainability .reliability,
supportability characteristics are at high level because of the long production run.
West Germany has Type 122 frigate program for its own navy. We select the
Meko 200 frigates which conversion of the Type 122 frigates with same weapon
systems and smaller hull.
The Turkish navy has these candidates to restructure its destroyer fleet based on
two different force structures. These force structures are as in Table 2. and Table 3^
The specifications and backgrounds about these destroyers and frigates are as
follows:




1st Squadron 2nd Squadron 3rd Squadron








1 unmod. destroyer 1 unmod. destroyer 1 unmod. destroyer
Total 15year LCC = S 2.61 Billion
TABLE 3
FORCE STRUCTURE TWO
1st Squadron 2nd Squadron 3rd Squadron







1 unmod. destroyer 1 unmod. destroyer 1 unmod destroyer
Total 15yearLCC = S 2.36 Billion
1. Perry Class Frigates
They are follow-on ships to the large number of frigates built in 1960s and
early 1970s, with the later ships emphasising anti-ship/aircraft/missile capabilities while
the previous classes were oriented primarily against submarines. Total number of the
frigates which have been constructed up to now is 61. This long construction run
reduced the unit-ship cost while increasing the maintainability, reliability and
supportability.
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This frigate is one of the strongest candidate for Turkish Destroyer Fleet,
because of the reasons we mentioned before. In addition to them, Turkey can
purchase these frigates by using FMS credits. As we mentioned before Turkey doesn't
have enough resources to buy these frigates by paying their costs in short period of
time, but it has capability in order to pay their costs in long-run, FMS provides credit
which interest rate is lower than market interest rate, and this reduces the total life-
cycle cost of the Turkish Destroyer Fleet.
Another important factor is, the training agreement between U.S. and Turkey
which can provide periodical personnel training for these frigates at low cost. Present
Logistic Support agreement includes some of the spare/support equipments which are
required for these frigates will reduce additional logistic support cost.
Data are of prime importance, and efforts to develop a satisfactory data base
must be started long before it becomes necessary to use such data for specific projects.
Both equipment specifications and operational assumptions must be covered.
[Ref 11: p. 82]
FRIGATE SPECIFICATIONS
I. PRIMARY EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS
A- Performance Specifications
a- Displacement : 2750-3583 ton
b- Speed : 29 knots
c- Operational range : 4500 miles at 20 knots
2. Electronics
a- Radar :
Long range Radar: AN/SPS 49 320 km max range
Search and navigation: AN/SPS 55 30 km max range
Weapon control: STIR 180 km max range
b- ECM/ECCM : SLQ 32 EW system
Mk 36 Super RBOC Chaffrack
c- Sonar :AN7SQS 56 30,000 yds. max range
T-Mk 6 Fanfare torpedo decoy system
d- Fire control system : Mk 92 weapon control system




76 mm OTO MELERA 20 mm PHALANX Mk 16 CIWS
90 rounds/min. 3000 rounds / min.
18,000 yds max range 4,000yds max range
b- A/S Weapons : 2 triple torpedo tubes Mk 32
8,600 yds max range at 15 knots ship speed
c- Missiles
SSM Harpoon SAM Standard
90 km max range 16 km. max range
4 rounds 36 rounds
4. Engines
a- Power: 40,000 shp single shaft
b- Type: Gas turbine
c- Specific fuel consumption: F 76
d- Fuel consumption: 2.3 ton/hr at 20 knots
B- Other Physical Data
.a- Size data: (135.6 x 13,7 x 7.5 ; 4.5 at sonar )
b- Basic metal types
Above the main deck construction metal is aluminium
Below the main deck construction metal is steel
C- Manufacturers : Bath Iron Works - USA
Todd Shipyards - USA
II. Support equipment specifications: New facilities for the overhaul of gas turbine
propulsion system is required which has S 50,000,000 cost.
2. Meko 200 Class Frigate
MEKO 200 class frigates are the conversion type of F122 Frigate which are
deployed by the West German Navy. The propulsion plant will be adopted for the
Turkish MEKO 200 class frigate is an diesel drive with 20 cylinder engines of the MTU
1163 series with a total maximum power 25,000 Kw acting on two variable pitch
propellers via rank reduction gears instead of gas turbine drive system in original
design.
Equipments for these frigates can be supplied from the United States by using
FMS credits. These equipments are 5" guns Mk 45 Mod. 1, AN/SQS-56 sonars, Sea
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sparrow SAM systems, HARPOON SSM systems, and torpedo tubes Mk 32 Mod. 5.
It is the first time that U.S equipment acquired with FMS loans is integrated into a
non U.S designed weapon system. The first two ships will be constructed by the West
German shipyards, and the next two ships will be constructed in Turkish naval
shipyards.
SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS
I. PRIMARY EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS
A. Performance Specifications
I- Ship frames
a- Displacement: 2000 ton standard, 2784 ton full
b- Speed: 27 knots
c- Operational range: 4000 miles at 20 knots
2.- Electronics
a- Radar
Long range air search: DA 8 APS 49; 180 km max range
Surface search radar: Plessey Dolphin; 30 km max range
Weapon control: STIR; 180 km max range
b- ECM/ECCM: Hycor/Super RBOC launcher
Nixie towed jammer
c- Sonar: SQS-56 hull mounted; 30,000 yds max range





One 5" U.S Mk 45 Three Sea guard CIWS
20 round/minute 3400 rounds/minute
20,000 yds. max range 3200 yds max range
b- A/S Weapons:
2 triple Mk 32 ASW torpedo tubes
Max range 8,600 yds. at 15 knot ship speed
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c- Missiles:
SSM; Harpoon SAM; Standard
90 km max range 16 km max range
8 rounds 20 rounds
4. Engines:
a- Power: 40,000 shp
b- Type: Diesel engine
c- Specific fuel consumption: F 76
d- Fuel Consumption: 2 ton/hour at 20 knot speed
B. Other Physical Data:
a- Size data: (110.5 x 13.3 x 4 ; 4.2 meters at sonar )
b- Basic material types:
Above the main deck construction material is aluminium
Below the main deck construction material is steel
C. Manufacturers: Blohm and Voss, Howaldtswerke-West Germany
Golcuk Naval Shipyard-Turkey
II. SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS
The present maintenance facilities are continuously modernized with the
technical and financial assistance of the West Germany. All the expenses for the
maintenance equipment are paid by the West Germany which free to charge.
III. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT SPECIFICATIONS
a- Force size: Each MEKO 200 fi*igate will operate with two or three modernized
Carpenter/Gearing class destroyers and one unmodernized Gearing class destroyer,
b- Geographical deployment: This fiigate was designed to operate in narrow seawater.
So it is superior in the Aegean sea and Turkish straits
c- Activity rates: Each frigate operates 2000 hours each year.
d- Organizational Concept: Each squadron consist of with five frigates/destroyers and
three squadrons are under the command of Turkish Destroyer Fleet.
e- Alert capability: At least one squadron should be able to depart from the main base
in 30 minutes.
f- Degree of system automation: High
g- Duration of system in operation: Ten days each month
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h- Training concept: Each two years one active SSM firing, one SAM firing and each
year twenty times active gun firing training, subsect Modernized Carpenter Class
Destroyer
The Carpenter class destroyers require significant upgrade of weapons to be as
capable as other escorts currently operating in the advanced navies. Turkish Navy
OfTicals stated that the Carpenter class destroyers should be compared with the Perry
class escorts. Upgrading these destroyers to the Perry class escort's level would make
them comparable to the most modern escort ships in the navy. But the initial
estimation showed that it would cost $ 198 million to overhaul and upgrade these
destroyers to be combat capable. This includes S 65 million for an overhaul to extend
the life of the ships an additional ten years. [Ref 12: p. 3]
So large expenses for ten year operational life for these destroyers isn't
economic. Instead of the large modernization program, Navy Officals advised that
these destroyers can be upgraded to have the capability to meet the requirements of





JOB DEFINITION MATERIAL INSTALLATION TOTAL




Install Harpoon 2.847 1.094 3.441
Upgrade habitability - - 1.100
Upgrade communication 1.576 2.040 3.616
Feasibility and design - - 1.187
TOTAL " " 40.655
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C. MODEL
The emphasis on comparing two systems for the same missions is called system
comparison studies. It is presumed that each competing system has already been "sub-
optimized" as to its configuration. The cost of each alternative are summarized by a
single life cycle cost estimate (LCC). The description of the effectiveness of each
alternative is provided separately.
Typically, system comparison studies have the following characteristics relating
to system life-cycle cost;
• Costs are generally required in less detail than in system configuration studies
where the emphasis was on components.
• In this type of study the specific spread of costs over time is usually ignored or
treated as a secondary problem.
[Ref ll:p.50]
D. ESTIMATING LIFE CYCLE COST
This step in the process is concerned with the actual calculation of the dollar
estimate. Cost estimates are developed within the framework, of cost-element lists.
Cost elements are subdivisions of the cost categories; R&D, production and
construction cost, operation and maintenance cost and system retirement and phase-
out cost. LCC cost involves all costs associated with the system hfe cycle, to include;
• Research and Development Cost (P.&D)- the cost of feasibility studies, system
analysis, detail design and development, construction, assembly and test of
engineering models, initial system test and evaluation and associated
documentation.
• Production and Construction Cost- the cost of construction, assembly and test
of operational systems, operation and maintenance of the production capability,
and associated initial logistic support requirements (e.g., test and support
equipment development, training, entry of items into the inventory, technical
data development, facility construction etc.).
• Operation and Maintenance Cost- the cost of sustaining operation, personnel
and maintenance support, spare/repair parts and related inventories, test and
support equipment maintenance transportation and handling, facilities,
modifications and technical data changes and so on.
• System Retirement and Phase-out Cost- the cost of phasing the system out of
the inventory due to obsolescence or wear out.
In Turkish Navy case we will buy some number of frigates which are constructed,
tested and deployed by the United States or West Germany. So we will not focus on
R&D and production and construction cost because they are included in the initial
procurement cost. Our life cycle cost formula is as in equation 4.1.
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LCC = [Cp^ + Co + Cop] (eqn4.1)
LCC = Life Cycle Cost
C_^ = Procurement Cost
Cq = Operation Cost
Cq_ = System Phase-out Cost
1. Procurement Cost
Procurement cost includes Research and Development (R&D) costs,
production and construction costs. iMajor cost components are system construction
cost, initial logistic support cost, maintenance facilities construction cost and initial
operating and maintenance training costs.
2. Operation and Maintenance Cost
Includes all costs associated with the operation and maintenance support of
the system throughout its life-cycle. Specific categories cover the cost of the system
operation, maintenance, sustaining logistic support, equipment modifications and
system/equipment phase-out and disposal. Costs are generally determined for each
year throughout its life-cycle as in Equation 4.2.
Co = tCoo + Con,+ Co^ + C^p] (eqn 4.2)
Cqq= Cost of system life-cycle operations
Cqjj^== Cost of system life-cycle maintenance
Cqj.= Cost of system modifications
Cq = Cost of system phase-out
a. Operations Cost (Cqq)
Includes all costs associated with the actual operation (not maintenance) of
the system throughout its life-cycle. Specific categories cover the costs of system
operational personnel (system operator), the formal training of the operators,
operational facilities, support and handling equipment necessar>' for system operation.
Our operation cost calculation formula will be as in Equation 4.3.
^00 = t^oop + <^oot "^ ^oof"^ <^ooel (^^^ ^-3)
Cqq_= Operating personnel cost
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^oot~ Cost of operator training
^oof~ ^°^^ °^ operational facilities
Cqqq= Cost of support and handling equipment
(1) Operating Personnel Cost (Cqqp). This category covers the costs of
operating personnel as allocated to the system. A single operator may operate more
than one system, but costs should be allocated on an individual system basis. Such
cost include base pay or salary and allowances; fringe benefits (insurance, medical
retirement), travel, clothing allowances, etc. Both direct and overhead costs are
included. The operating personnel calculation formula is as in Equation 4.4.
Coop = (ToXCpoXQpoXNpo) ('/« AUocation) (eqn 4.4)
Tq = Hours of system operation
CpQ= Cost of operator labor
Q_Q= Quantity of operator labor
N-Q= Number of operating systems
(2) Operator Training Cost (Cqqj)- Initial operator training cost is
included in the procurement cost. This category covers the formal training of
personnel assigned to operate the system. Such training is accomplished on a periodic
basis throughout the system life-cycle to cover personnel replacements due to attrition.
Total costs include instructor time, supervision, student pay and allowances while in
school, training facilities (allocation of portion of facility) required specifically for
formal training, training aids, equipment and data, and student transportation as
applicable. Operator training cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.5.
Coot= (QsoX^tXCtop) (eqn 4.5)
CgQ = Quantity of student operators
Tj. = Duration of training program (week)
CjQp= Cost of operator training (S/student-week)
(3) Operational Cost {Cqqp). Initial acquisition of the frigates is included
in procurement cost. This category covers the annual recurring costs associated with
the fuel, ammunition, missiles for test fire during the operation, etc. Utility costs are
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also included, and are proportionately allocated to each frigate. Cost calculation
formula is as in Equation 4.6.
^oof= (Spe "^ Cu)(% Allocation X N^^) (eqn 4.6)
C___= Cost of operational facility support (S/unit)
Cy = Cost of utilities
Nq5 = Number of operational units
(4) Support and Handling Equipment Cost (C ). Initial acquisition cost
for operational support and handling equipment is covered in initial procurement cost.
This category includes the annual recurring usage and maintenance costs for these
items which are required to support system operation throughout system life-cycle.
The costs specifically cover equipment operation (not covered elsewhere), equipment
corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance. The cost calculation formula is as
in Equation 4.7.
'ooe = t^ooo + <^oou + ^oosl (^q^ ''•^)
Cqqq= Cost of operation
Cqqq= Cost of equipment corrective maintenance
Cqqj= Cost of equipment preventive maintenance
<=ooe
= KQcaX^mhcX^ocp) + (QcaX^^hc) + (QcaXCoc)]Nos (^^^ ^.8)
Q^^ = Quantity of corrective maintenance actions
^^mhc~ Corrective maintenance man-hours
Cq^_= Corrective maintenance labor cost
^mhc~ Cost of material handling
C^^ = Cost of corrective maintenance documentation
Nqj = Number of systems
Coos = f(QpaXMmhpXCoop) + (QpaXC^^p) + (QpaXCdp)]Nos (eqn 4.9)
^PA ~ Quantity of preventive maintenance action
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^mhD~ Preventive maintenance manhour
Cq_p= Preventive maintenance labor cost
^mhp~ Cost of material handling
C^^_ = Cost of preventive maintenance documentation
Nq5 = Number of operational systems
b. Maintenance Cost (C^^)
Includes all sustaining maintenance labor, spare/repair parts, test and
support equipment, transportation and handling, replenishment training, support data
and facilities necessary to meet the maintenance needs of the prime equipment
throughout its life-cycle. Such needs include both corrective and preventive
maintenance requirements at all units.
The Maintenance Cost calculation formula as in Equation 4.10.
^om't^omm'^^omx'^^oms'^^omt'^^omp'^^omf+CQjj^^] (eqn4.10)
^omm= M^iiitcnance personnel and support cost
^omx~ Cost of spare/repair parts
^oms~ ^^^^ ^^^ support equipment maintenance cost
^omt~ Transportation and handling cost
^omf~ ^°^^ of maintenance facilities
^omd~ ^°^^ of technical data
(1) Maintenance Personnel and Support Cost (C^^^). Includes corrective
and preventive maintenance labor associated material handling and supporting
documentation. When a system malfunction occurs or when a scheduled maintenance
action is performed, personnel manhours are expanded the handling of spares and
related materials takes place, and maintenance action reports are completed. This
category includes all directly related costs, and calculation formula is as in Equation
4.11.
<^omm=t<^oou + <^oos] (eqn4.11)
^oou~ ^°^^ of equipment corrective maintenance
Cqqj= Cost of equipment preventive maintenance
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(2) Corrective Maintenance Cost (C^^^^y This category includes the
personnel activity costs associated with the accomplishment of corrective maintenance.
Related spares, test and support equipment, transportation,training and facility costs
are covered in initial acquisition cost. Total cost includes the sum of individual costs
for each maintenance actions anticipated over the entire system life-cycle. A
maintenance action includes any requirement for corrective maintenance resulting from
catastrophic failures, dependent failures, operator/maintenance induced faults,
manufacturing defects, etc. The cost per maintenance action considers the personnel
labor expended for direct tasks (localization, fault isolation,remove and replace, repair,
verification), associated administrative, material handling and maintenance
documentation (failure reports, spares issue reports). Both direct labor and overhead
costs are included. The cost calculation formula is as seen in Equation 4.12.
Coou=[(QcaXMmhcXCocp) + (QcaXCmhc) + (QcaXCdc)KNn,s) (eqn4.12)
^ca
"^ Quantity of corrective maintenance actions
Mj^^= Corrective maintenance manhours
^ocp~ Corrective maintenance labor cost
^mhc~ Cost of material handling
C^^ = Cost of documentation
^ms ~ Number of maintenance units
(3) Preventive Maintenance Cost (C^^^), This category includes the
personnel activity costs associated with the accomplishment of preventive or scheduled
maintenance. Total cost includes the sum of individual costs for each preventive
maintenance action multiplied by the quantity of mauitenance actions anticipated over
the system life-cycle. A maintenance action includes serving, lubrication, inspection,
overhaul, calibration, periodic system check-outs, and the accomplishment of scheduled
critical item replacements. The costs per maintenance action consider the personnel
labor expended for preventive maintenance tasks, associated administrative, material
handling and maintenance documentation. Both direct labor and overhead costs are
included. The cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.13.
Coos = I(QpaXMnj,pXCopp)+ (QpaXCmhp) + (QpaXCdp)lNms (eqn4.13)
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Q_^ = Quantity of preventive maintenance actions
i\lj^p= Preventive maintenance manhours per action
Cq p= Preventive maintenance labor costs
^mho ~ ^°^^ °^ material handling per action
C^p = Cost of documentation per action
^ms ~ Number of maintenance units
(4) Spare/Repair Parts Cost (C^^^. This category includes all
replenishment spare/repair parts and consumeable materials (e.g., oil, lubricants, fuel,
etc.) that are required to support maintenance activities associated with prime
equipment, operational support and handling equipment, test and support equipment,
and training equipment at each unit. This category covers the cost of purchasing, the
actual cost of material itself; and the cost of holding and maintaining items in the
inventory. Costs are assigned to the applicable level of maintenance. Specific
quantitative requirements for spares are derived from the logistic support analysis.
Cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.14.
Comx=[Cso + Csi+C,d + C33 + C3j (eqn4.14)
CjQ_ Cost of organizational spare/repair parts
C^^= Cost of intermediate spare/repair parts
C5^= Cost of depot spare/repair parts
Cjj= Cost of supplier spare/repair parts
C^^= Cost of consumeables
Cso = a(Ca)(Qa) + Z(CmiXQmi) + S(Cj^XQhi)] " (eqn4.15)
C^ = Average cost material purchase order
Qg = Quantity of purchase orders
C^ = Cost of spare item
Qj^ = Quantity of items required or demanded
C^ = Cost of maintaining spare item in the inventor>'
Q^ = Quantity of the item in the inventory
Cj-
,
Cj^ and C^^ are determined in a similar manner.
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(5) Test and Support Equipment Cost (C^^^). Initial acquisition cost for
test and support equipment is covered in the system initial acquisition cost. This
category includes the annual recurring life-cycle maintenance cost for test and support
equipment at each unit. Maintenance constitutes both corrective and preventive
maintenance, and the costs are derived on a similar basis with prime equipment. In
some instances specific items of test and support equipment are utilized for more than
one system, and in such cases, associated costs are allocated proportionately to each
system concerned. The cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.16.
Coms=tCseo + C,ei + Csed] (eqn4.16)
^seo~ ^°^^ of organizational test and support equipment
^sei~ ^°^^ of intermediate test and support equipment
^sed~ ^^^^ of depot test and support equipment
^seo^t^oou-^^^oos] (eqn4.17)
^oou~ ^°^^ of equipment corrective maintenance
Cqq5= Cost of equipment preventive maintenance
Coou=!(QcaXMnj,cXCocp) + (QcaXCmhc) + (QcaXCdc)INms (^^^ ^.IS)
'ca
Quantity of corrective maintenance actions
^mhc~ Corrective maintenance manhours
^ocD~ Corrective maintenance labor cost
^mhc~ ^°^^ of material handling per corrective action
C^^ = Cost of documentation per corrective action
^ms ~ Number of units
Coos = KQpa)(MmhpXCopp)+ (Qpa)(C„j,p) + (QpaXCdp)]N^3 (eqn 4. 19)
Qpg = Quantity of preventive maintenance actions
Mj^_= Preventive maintenance actions
Cq-^ = Preventive maintenance labor cost
^mho" ^°^^ of material handling per preventive action
Cjjp = Cost of documentation per preventive action
Nj^5 = Number of units
Cgg- and Cgg^ are determined in similar manner.
(6) Transportation and Handling Cost (C^^^). This category includes all
sustaining transportation and handling (or packaging and shipping) between
organizational, intermediate, depot and supplier facilities in support and maintenance
operations. This includes to return of faulty material items to supplier, shipment of
spare/repair parts, persormel,data,etc., from the supplier to forward operational units.
Cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.20.
Comt = [(CtXQ,) 4- (CpXQp)] (eqn 4.20)
C^= Cost of transportation
C= Cost of packaging
Q^ = Quantity of one = way shipping
C^ = (W)(C^3) (eqn 4.21)
W = Weight of item
C^5= Shipping cost
Cp = (W)(C^p) (eqn 4.22)
C^_= Packaging cost (S/ton)
(7) Maintenance Training Cost (C^^). This category covers the formal
training of personnel assigned to maintain the prime equipment, test and support
equipment and training equipment. Such training is accomplished on a periodic basis
throughout the system life-cycle to cover the personnel replacements due to attrition.
Total cost includes instructor, supervision, student pay and allowances while in school,
training facilities (allocation of portion of facility required specifically for formal
training) and student transportation. The cost calculation formula is as in Equation
4.23.
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Comp = f(QsmXTtXCtom)l (tqn4.23)
^sm ~ Quantity of maintenance students
^tom~ ^°^^ of maintenance training
Tj. = Duration of training program
(8) Maintenance Facilities Cost {C^^e). Initial acquisition cost for
maintenance facilities is included in initial system acquisition cost. This category
covers the annual recurring costs associated with the occupancy and support (repair,
modification,paint,etc.,) of maintenance shops at all units throughout the system life-
cycle. On some occasions, a given maintenance shop will support more than one
system, and in such cases, associated costs are allocated proportionately to each system
concerned. Cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.24.
Comf= (Cppn,+ C^)(% AHocationXN^^g) (eqn 4.25)
^DDm~ ^°^^ of maintenance facility support per unit
C^ = Cost of utihties per unit
^ms
" Number of maintenance units
(9) Technical Data Cost {C^^J). Initial technical data preparation costs
are included in initial system acquisition cost. This category includes any other data
necessary to support the operation and maintenance of the system throughout its life-
cycle. Our cost calculation formula is as in Equation 4.26.
Comdex ^omdi (eqn 4.26)
^omdi^ Cost of specific data item
(10) System Equipment Modification Cost (C^^). Throughout the
system life-cycle, after equipment has been delivered to the operational field,
modifications are often proposed and initiated to improve system performance,
effectiveness or a combination of both. This category includes modification kit design,
material, installation and test instructions, personnel and supporting resources for
incorporateing the modification kit, technical data change documentation, formal
training to cover the new configuration, spares, etc. The modification may effect all
elements of logistics. Cost calculation formula is as in equation 4.27.
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Co„=IC„^ (eqn4.27)
^oni~ Cost of specific modification
3. System Phase-out Cost (C^-)
This category covers the liability or assets incurred when an item is
condemned or disposed. This factor is applicable throughout the system/equipment
life-cycle when phase-out occurs. This category represents the only element of cost
that may turn out to have a negative value-resulting when the reclamation value of the
end item is larger than the disposal cost. The cost calculation formula is as in
Equation 4.28.
Cop = l(FcXQcaXCdis-Crec)l («1" ^.28)
F^ = Condemnation factor
Q = Quantity of corrective maintenance actions
^dis~ ^°^^ of system/equipment disposal
^rec~ Reclamation value
E. COST CALCULATION
We will calculate annual operating cost for each type frigate/ destroyer in the
given two different force structures. Acquisition price of the new frigates and
purchasing price of the equipments/ systems which are necessary for modernization of
the present Carpenter/Gearing class destroyers are obtained from different selling
agreements.
1. Cost Calculation For MEKO 200 Frigates
MEKO 200 class frigate has S 290,000,000 initial acquisition cost for Turkish
Navy which relatively cheaper than U.S Perry class frigates. This initial acquisition
cost will be paid in seven years by the Turkey.
The first two frigates will be constructed by the West German shipyards and
the last two frigates will be constructed by the Turkish Naval shipyards. The main
ship systems, weapon systems will be prepared by the West German shipyards and
system manufacturers. Then they send them to the Turkish shipyards. The hull and
simple systems will be constructed in the Turkish shipyards, then ship systems and
weapon systems will be mounted by shipyard personnel with the technical assistance of
West Germany.
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Defense systems which have high technology are labor intensive construction.
In Turkey, labor cost is low if it is compared with the labor cost in West Germany.
The difierance in labor cost will be saving for Turkish Navy. In addition to this some
simple equipment and spare parts can be manufactured by the Turkish industry at
relatively low cost.
The cost of main weapon systems which can be purchased from the United
States will be paid by using FMS credits. It means during the pay-back period, the
equipment cost will not be higher than their cash price. Because the FMS interest rate
is lower than market interest rate.
In annual cost calculation, operating personnel cost isn't high because of the
low salaries of the operating personnel. Operational cost is relatively low, since the
annual active operation is only 2000 hours and active missile firing for training and test
is limited. When ship in the main base steam, water, electricity will be supplied by the
shore facilities.
Spare part and inventory holding cost isn't as high as they are in Perry class
frigate's cost calculation. Because spare part lead time and average inventory level are
smaller and some of the spare parts will be manufactured by the Turkish industry.
Operating personnel training cost higher. Some of the systems in this ships
are new for operating personnel and training takes long time. Small number of
operator will be trained in West Germany and Netherland in order to learn system
effectively.
Spare part cost is calculated by using data which obtained from previously
deployed Berk class frigates. Maintenance personnel cost is calculated by using the
maintenance labor allowances which derived by the shipyards. Maintenance facilities
cost will be shared by each frigate/destroyer based on their maintenance work load.
Based on these assumptions annual cost calculation is shown shown in Table
5.
a. Cost Calculation For Perry Class Frigate
This frigate has S 360,000,000 initial acquisition price. This price doesn't
include maintenance facilities cost which are essential for the maintenance of gas
turbine main propulsion system. Additional maintenance facilities cost wall be
approximately S 50,000,000 and will be divided among the three frigates. These frigates
can be purchased by using FMS credits and payment can be made in ten years. The
net present value of the acquisition cost will not be higher than the cash price of these
destroyers, because of the low interest rate of FMS credits.
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TABLE 5
ANNUAL COST FOR MEKO 200
OPERATION MAINTENANCE COST
OPERATION COST
Operation personnel cost 309,200
Operator training cost 242,100
Operational cost 1,637,200
Support and handling cost 157,900
TOTAL 2,346,400
MAINTENANCE COST
Maintenance personnel and support cost 50,900
Cost of spare repair parts 684,200
Test and support cost 19,600
Transportation and handling cost 4,200
Maintenance training cost 3,500
Maintenance facilities cost 438,600
Technical data cost 10,500
TOTAL 1,211,500
TOTAL OPERATION COST 3,557,900
THREE YEAR OVERHAUL COST
Overhaul labor cost 285,000
Overhaul facilities cost 168,000
Overhaul material/ spare part cost 789,375
TOTAL OVERHAUL COST 1,242,375
In the annual cost calculation of the Perry class frigates operation
personnel cost isn't high since the low operator allowances. Operator training cost is
lower than it is in MEKO 200 class frigate annual cost calculation. Almost every
operator is familiar with the United States designed systems, and training can be
accomplished in the present training facilities.
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Figure 4.1 LCC for MEKO 200 class frigate.
Cost of spare and repair parts will be high. Because the lead time is long
and long lead time needs high inventory level for spare and maintenance parts.
Maintenance facilities cost is lower than the MEKO 200 class frigate's cost, because
most of the preventative maintenance are accomplished by the operation personnel.
Maintenance cost is calculated by using same approach as it is in the
annual cost calculation of MEKO 200 class frigates. Annual active operation time is
assumed 2000 hours.
Based on these assumptions aimual operation and maintenance cost of
Perry class frigates is shown in Table 6.
In the calculation of LCC, we assumed that these frigates will have 30 year
economic life. During this period they will not be modernized in order to increase their
capabilities. In the comparsion of the LCC cost of these frigates we will use net
present values of all expenses which occur during their operational life. Annual
discount rate is assumed 8 per cent in the LCC calculation. Based on these
assumptions the LCC of Perry class frigates is shown on shown in Figure 4.2.
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL COST FOR PERRY CLASS FRIGATE
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE COST
-
OPERATION COST
Operation personnel cost 258,000
Operator training cost 153.300
Operational facilities cost 1,684,000
Support and handling equipment cost 145,700
TOTAL 2,241,000
iMAINTENANCE COST
Maintenance personnel and support cost 37,500
Cost of spare and repair parts 870,300
Test and support cost 21,500
Transportation and handling cost 8,700
Maintenance training cost 27,500
Maintenance facilities cost 525,750
Technical data cost 22,000
TOTAL 1,513,250
TOTAL OPERATION COST 3,754,250
THREE YEAR OVERHAUL COST
Overhaul labor cost 307,000
Overhaul facilities cost 175,000
Overhaul material/spare part cost 1,090,000
TOTAL OVERHAUL COST 1,572,000
2. Annual cost calculation for modernized destroyers
Operation cost of these destroyer still higher than the annual operation cost of
MEKO 200 and Perry class. Main reasons are high fuel consumption, low
maintainability and lack, of maintenance/ spare parts. But operator training cost is
lower.
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Figure 4.2 LCC for Perry Class Frigates.
In our operation cost calculation, we assumed that the active operation tiine
will be 2200 hours for these destroyers. Because these destroyers need at least 3 hours
time in order to leave from the main naval base when necessary. When these destroyers
are responsible for emergency duty all the ship systems should be in operation during
this period.
These destroyers have been in operation in Turkish Navy since 1970, but
naval shipyards and maintenance support facihties don't have any record about their
maintenance characterestics, like mean time between failure, mean time to repair,
failure density function etc. We will use the data which obtained from the shipyard
records for the future maintenance cost calculation.
Based on these assumptions annual operation and maintenance cost for the
modernized carpenter class destroyer is shown in Table 7.
In the LCC calculation the economic life of modernized Carpenter class
destroyer is assumed 15 years, and during this period there is no additional
modernization. Annual inflation rate is assumed 8 per cent.
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TABLE 7
ANNUAL COST FOR MODERNIZED CARPENTER CLASS
DESTROYER
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE COST
OPERATION COST
Operation personnel cost 257,680
Operator training cost 30,350
Operational cost 1,993,890
Support and Iiandling equipment cost 126,300
TOTAL 2,480,220
MAINTENANCE COST
Maintenance personnel and support cost 126,300
Cost of spare and repair parts 868,400
Test and support cost 13,000
Transportation and handling cost 15,250
Maintenance training cost 8,700
Maintenance facilities cost 658,000
Technical data cost 2,600
TOTAL 1,692,250
TOTAL OPERATION COST 4,100,470
THREE YEAR OVERHAUL COST
Overhaul labor cost 475,000
Overhaul facilities cost 210,000
Overhaul material/ spare part cost 631,500
TOTAL OVERHAUL COST 1,316,500
Based on these assumptions LCC of modernized Carpenter class destroyer is
shown on Figure 4.3.
3. Annual cost calculation for Unmodernized destroyers
These destroyers have the lowest annual operation cost among the four
different type frigates/destroyers. Cost of spare and repair parts is lower than it is in
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Figure 4.3 LCC for Modernized Carpenter Class Destroyer.
the cost calculation of the modernized Carpenter class destroyers. Because some of the
present electronic support and ECM systems aren't in operation and there is no
maintenance action for them.
Three year overhaul cost is higher than it is in the modernized Carpenter class
destroyer cost calculation. These destroyers have not been overhauled effectively since
their deployment date by the Turkish Navy. Especially main electricity power
distribution system is in poor condition and their maintenance is expensive.
Annual active operation time is 2200 hours for these destroyers because of the
same reason the modernized destroyers have. iMaintenance personnel and mahitcnance
facilities cost are calculated by using the data which were obtained from the past
maintenance records.
Based on these assumptions annual operation and maintenance cost of these
destroyers is shown in Table 8.
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TABLE 8




Operation personnel cost 258,000
Operator training cost 10,350
Operational cost 1,050,300
Support and handling equipment cost 52,600
TOTAL 1,371,250
MAINTENANCE COST
Maintenance personnel and support cost 126,300
Cost of repair/spare parts 651,300
Test and support cost 8,500
Transportation and handling cost 15,250
Maintenance training cost 3,500
Maintenance facilities cost 723,800
Technical data cost 1,000
TOTAL MAINTENANCE COST 1,528,750
TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE COST 2,900,000
THREE YEAR OVERHAUL COST
Overhaul labor cost 522,500
Overhaul facilities cost 231,000
Overhaul material and spare part cost 726,250
TOTAL OVERHAUL COST 1,479,750
We assumed that these destroyers will be in operation for 15 years in the
Turkish Destroyer Fleet and during the this period there is no system modernization in
order to increase their capabilities.
Based on these assumptions the LCC of the Gearing class destroyers is shown
on Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 LCC for Unmodernized Gearing Class Destroyer.
4. System Life-cycle Cost Calculation
Present worth of the expenditure stream at a selected discount rate is one of
the most important part of the system life-cycle cost calculation. It is appropriate
where questions of the impact upon the national economy arise. In the Department of
Defense, analysis do often subsequently test the sensitivity of decisions to various
discount rates. The specific discount rate appropriate to Department of Defense
studies is still being debated, with values from 5 per cent to 15 per cent typically being
suggested. In our case we considered the discount rate as 8 per cent. [Ref 1 1: p. 47]
The term "amortization" something a misnomer is analogous to the scrap
value conception in equipment/system replacement studies. When systems are
compared whose lifetime seem to differ widely, for example, when comparing ship
systems whose useful lifetimes historically have been fifteen years, or considerably
greater, with helicopter systems which have not seemed to have had this performance.
The argument is that it is unfair to charge the shipsystem with the whole investment
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cost if it will be useful for a considerable time beyond the "X" years considered in the
study.
,
In our force life-cycle cost calculation the frigates/destroyers have different
useful lifetimes. When modernized Carpenter and unmodemized Gearing class
destroyers have 15 year useful lifetimes, new frigates have 30 year useful lifetimes in
Turkish Navy. So we decided to calculate the force life-cycle cost for 15 year period.
The value of the each force structure at the end of 15 year period is calculated by using
sum of the digit amortization method.
TABLE 9
FORCE LCC CALCULATION

















Salvage Value 254,555,000 297,289,400
NPV of LCC 2,610,948,000 2,358,915,700
Costs which have already been incurred at the time an analysis is made are "sunk
costs" and should not be included in the comparsion of the alternatives. We didn't
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include the present value of the Carpenter, Gearing class destroyers in our life cycle
cost calculation. In addition, the present value of the present maintenance facilities
which are enough for the maintenance of the force structure II wasn't included while
maintenance facilities cost was included in the life cycle cost calculation of the force
structure I.







Figure 4.5 Force I and Force II Life-cycle Cost.
F. MEASUREMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS
The aspects of effectiveness can be quantified in terms of one or more figures of
merit (FOMs), depending on the specific mission or system characteristics that one
wishes to measure. Effectiveness must consider:
• System performance and physical parameters - capacity, range, accuracy,
volume, speed, weight, and so on.
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• System operational and support factors - availability, dependability,
maintainability, supportability, and so on.
• Total life-cycle cost - research and development cost, production and
construction cost, operation and maintenance cost, retirement and disposal
cost, and so on.
[Ref. 13: p. 77]
Establishing a relationship between a performance or operational parameter and
cost may constitute a desirable cost effectiveness FOiM. In Turkish Destroyer Fleet
case our FOMs are
Effectiveness FOM^,^ = l^^^iJlt^cy^&Tost (^1" ^.29)
FOiMggj^= Figure of iMerit for SSM capability
In the calculation offeree SSM capacity, we only summed up the number of the
SSM which are carried by the destroyers/frigates. Because in two different force
structures all the destroyers/frigates are equipped with Harpoon missile system. The
force SSM capacity calculation is shown on Appendix A.
Effectiveness FOM,^^ =
^y°Jt?n?{:i^e-cS'?e Cost (^1" 4.30)
FOMg^j^ = Figure of Merit for SAM capability
In the calculation of force SAM capacity, we followed the same procedure. All
the SAM systems are Seasparrow air defense system in the two force structures, and
there is no differance between their capabilities. The force SAM capacity calculation is
shown on Appendix B.
EfTectiveness FOM • ForceAir Radar coverage rean4^ntrr i t-UM^^ jjystem Lile-cycie Cost (eqn^.:5i;
FOM^-j. = Figure of Merit for air search capabihty
One of the most important duty of this fleet is to accomplish early air detection
of enemy aircrafts in the operational field. Both two force structure have enough air
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search capability in order to cover all the Turkish coast along the Black sea, Aegean
sea and Mediterranean sea with the help of ground radar bases. We measured air
radar coverage capacity in terms of squarekilometers. The calculation of force air





FOMjj.g = Figure of Merit for long range gun power
This effectiveness measurement is the hardest one to measure. There are
three different types long range gun in two different force structures.
In order to be able to compare their fire power we used weighted quantitative
method for each type of long range gun. The force long range gun power calculation is
shown on Appendix D. [Ref. 14: p. 97]
FfFprtivpnp<:Q FOVf = Force short range Gun Power /„__ j ->-,%bttec iveness tUM^^^ System Lite-cycie Cost ^^^^ "^'^^^
FOM^ijg = Figure of Merit for air defense gun power
The number of the active firing is the most important aspect of the short range
missile/aircraft defense system. We didn't take into account the firing rate and max
range of the different gun types. Our calculation includes the number of firing which
can be accomplished by using ready ammunition when the target is in their firing
range. The calculation of force air defense gun power is shown on Appendix E.
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The values of the FOMs are as in Table 10.
TABLE 10
VALUES OF THE FOMS
FOM Force I Forcell
FO^^ssm 1.99 X 10-^ 3.05 X 10-^
FOM3,^ 7.2 X 10-S 5.93 X 10"^
FOM^i, 1.286 X 10-3 1.128x10-^
FOMi^g 1.43 X 10"^ 1.655 X 10-"^
FOM.dg 5.75 X 10"^ 10.77 X 10"^
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V. CONCLUSION
In general, economic analysis/program evaluation will be used by managers as an
input in selecting the most cost effective alternative. As a rule, the best criterion, in
cases where benefits and outputs are a determining factor, is to prefer that alternative
which yields the greatest benefits or effectiveness for a given level of cost (discounted).
In situations where it is difficult to quantify benefits and measures of effectiveness, it is
important to provide as much useful information as possible to enable a decision to be
made as to which alternative yields the most benefits or effectiveness. Where special
considerations require selection of other than the cost effective alternative, these
considerations must be compelling and defensible. [Ref 15: p. 12-13]
Selection of the best system among the competing alternatives is the hardest step
for the decision maker. As an example, in our case, the decision maker may select
force structure II over force structure I because it has higher cost effectiveness on
SSM, long range gun power and short range air defense gun power which are necessary
for offensive surface operation. On the other hand he may think that industrial
support, training of enlisted men, maintenance of shipsystems are easier in force
structure II. Or the decision maker may select force structure I over force structure II
because the air search capability and SAM capability of force structure I which are
necessary for defensive operation are better than force structure II. In addition, he
may think that changing the type of vessels may create unacceptable logistics problem
in future.
In defense decision making process, the decision maker is influenced by the
political situation and economic situation as well as the combat needs of the naval
forces. Because of these reasons the best alternative isn't so obvious in our case, and




FORCE SSM POWER CALCULATION
TABLE 11
FORCE I SSM POWER
Type of
destroyers/ frigates
Number of Number of missiles
destroyes/ frigates on the ship
Total
Perry Class 3 4 12
Modernized destroyer 5 8 40
Total Force SSM power 52
TABLE 12
FORCE II SSM POWER
Type of
destroyer/ frigate
Number of Number of missiles
destroyer/ frigate on the ship
Total
MEKO 200 4 8 32
Modernized destroyer 5 8 40
Total force SAM capacity 72
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APPENDIX B
FORCE SAM POWER CALCULATION
TABLE 13
FORCE I SAM POWER
Type of
destroyers/frigates
Number of Number of missiles
destroyers/frigates on the ship
Total
Perry class 3 36 108
Modernized destroyer 4 20 80
Total Force SAM power 188
TABLE 14
FORCE II SAM POWER
Tvpe of
destroyers/frigates
Number of Number of missiles
destroyers/ frigates on the ship
Total
MEKO 200 4 20 80
Modernized destroyer 3 20 60
Total Force SAM Power 140
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APPENDIX C
FORCE AIR RADAR COVERAGE
TABLE 15
FORCE I AIR RADAR COVERAGE
Type of air Number of Air search
search radar radar capacity




AN SPS 40 4 321,526 1,286,144
AN SPS 29 8 138,474 1,107,792
Total force air coverage 3,357,544
TABLE 16









DA 8 APS 49 4 101,736 406,944
AN SPS 40 4 321,526 1,286,144
AN SPS 29 7 138,474 969,318
Total Force air radar coverage 2,262,406
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APPENDIX D
FORCE LONG RANGE GUN POWER
TABLE 17
FORCE I LONG RANGE GUN POWER








OTO MELERA 3 80 136 32,640
5738" gun 54 20 316 341,288
Total long range gun power 373,920
TABLE 18











5756" Mk 45 4 25 426 42,600
5"/38" gun 50 316 348,000
Total long range gun power 390,600
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APPENDIX E
FORCE SHORT RANGE GUN POWER
TABLE 19








PHALANAX 3 3,000 9000
35 mm Oerlikon 12 360 4,320
40 mm Bofors 18 80 1,440
Total force short range gun power 14,760
TABLE 20








Sea Guard 12 1,660 19,920
35 mm Oerlikon 11 360 3,960
40 mm Bofors 16 80 1,520
Total Force shorte range gun power 25,400
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